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Abstract
In the 1990s, companies collected billions in premiums from peculiarly structured put op-
tions written on their own stock while almost all of these puts expired worthless. Buyers
of these options, primarily nancial intermediaries, lost money as a result. Although these
losses might seem puzzling, by o¤ering to buy put options from better informed parties,
intermediaries receive private information about the issuing company. We nd that mag-
nitude of changes and structural breaks in the stocksprice trends and volumes around
the put sales indicate that the intermediaries were indeed acting on this information and
potentially made hundreds of billions of dollars.
In February 1991, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a ruling that
allowed publicly-traded companies to sell put options written on their own stock. This
practice began modestly with IBM, which realized prots in 1992 in excess of $2 million
from its put-option sales.1 The practice quickly spread to companies such as Microsoft,
which over a seven-year period beginning in 1993, received over $2 billion in total premiums
from sales of puts including $766 million in 1999 alone.2 While bringing in such signicant
revenues, company-written put options expired out of the money in almost all cases.
Although the original spirit of the SEC ruling was to allow companies to issue put op-
tions publicly on an organized exchange like the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE),
most companies placed their options privately with nancial intermediaries such as invest-
ment banks and other qualied institutional buyers.3 The writing of a put option is a
zero-sum game in which the two parties bet on the direction and magnitude of future
stock price changes. Presumably, the manager of a company is better informed about the
companys stock outlook than the outside intermediary. Yet, despite the asymmetric infor-
mation between intermediaries and the companys managers, these sophisticated nancial
intermediaries bet against better informed parties. In Guys and Dolls, Sky Masterson gives
the following advice:
One of these days in your travels, a guy is going to show you a brand-new deck
of cards on which the seal is not yet broken. Then this guy is going to o¤er to bet
1University of Virginia, Darden Case Study UVA- F-1009 (1992).
2For a detailed Microsoft case study refer to Gyoshev et al. (2012).
3The initial ruling to allow the sale of put options was in fact made in favour of a request submitted by
the CBOE.
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you that he can make the jack of spades jump out of this brand-new deck of cards
and squirt cider in your ear. But, son, do not accept this bet, because as sure as you
stand there, you are going to wind up with an ear full of cider.
The nancial intermediaries appear to be ignoring this advice. Furthermore, institu-
tional investors commonly approach issuing companies about purchasing such put options.4
Thus, they are actively seeking an investment that should be disadvantageous to them; a
sucker betas Sky Masterson might say. Also intriguing, in most cases including Microsoft,
these peculiarly structured options are exercisable by the purchaser only at maturity but
the issuing company has the option at any time to settle in cash or stock.5
Three plausible explanations exist for this behavior. First, the nancial intermedi-
aries are hedging against declines in the stock market. Supporting this idea is that these
transactions occurred between 1992 and 2000, which was a period in the midst of a pro-
longed bull market. Second, managers show overcondence about their companys future
prospects.6 This overcondence could cause managers to underprice the options, which
can be exploited by the nancial intermediaries. Third, the nancial intermediaries, while
losing on the purchase of the put options, are proting from knowing that the companies
are willing to sell them the put options. This willingness reects the positive outlook of
company insiders and can be exploited by the intermediary by buying shares that are likely
4For example, Tom Pratt (1994) cites Paul Mazzilli at Morgan Stanley & Co. as stating that a large
portion of the companies that do programs with me have been introduced to [selling put derivatives], and
use the strategy.
5As stated in the companies10-Q or 10-K statements, for example in Microsofts June 30, 1995 10-K
ling: Puts are exercisable only at maturity, and are settleable in cash at Microsofts option.
6See Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) for both an overview and a reason why managerial overcondence
as a characteristic could be benecial to the company.
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to increase in value. This informational advantage is long-lived since, on average, the time
from the date of the put-option trade to the date that it is disclosed to the public is more
than six months.
Let us examine the rst explanation in more detail. Although giving a company an
option to buy back the put limits the companys exposure, it also limits the protection of
the intermediary. Thus, their use as insurance by nancial intermediaries is questionable.
We see this explicitly in the case of Microsoft. When the largest amount of put options per
quarter was issued by Microsoft (February 2000 was most likely the last month of issue), the
stock price su¤ered the black swan event of both the dot-com crash (starting March 2000)
and the Supreme Court ruling against Microsoft (April 3, 2000). During this tumultuous
time, the intermediary allowed Microsoft to repurchase the put options at a loss of $1.4
billion (in the 2001 scal year). While substantial, this amount is in stark contrast to what
might have happened without this repurchase option. The per-share stock price fell from
$111.87 in March 23, 2000, to $41.50 on December 20, 2000. Thus, out of the $12.2 billion
potential repurchase obligation, Microsoft could have paid as much as $5.7 billion in the
worst case or $2.4 billion using average stock prices.7 Given that Microsoft obtained a $667
million prot overall despite the most adverse events, we can conclude that insurance could
7Microsoft 2000 Annual Report for the scal year ending on June 30, 2000, stated that On June 30,
2000, warrants to put 157 million shares were outstanding with strike prices ranging from $70 to $78 per
share. The put warrants expire between September 2000 and December 2002.Using average stock price
for this period of $58.85 and the mean strike price of $74, if the options were allowed to expire, Microsoft
would have lost $2.4 billion. In the worst case scenario, using a strike price of $78 and a share price of
$41.50, Microsoft would have lost $5.7 billion.
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not be the reason why nancial intermediaries buy put options.
Moving to the second explanation of whether the companys managers su¤er from over-
condence, we examine the abnormal stock performance. If the stock price abnormally
goes down after the sale of the put options, then this decrease could be a sign of overcon-
dence. In contrast, if the stock price abnormally goes up (or stays the same) after the
sale of the stock options, then overcondence of the companys managers can be ruled out
as an explanation for the transaction. We perform this test on a sample of 18 companies
selling put options and nd that after the initial sale, there is a 60-day cumulative abnor-
mal (risk-adjusted) return of 10.4%. See Figure 1 for a graph of the cumulative abnormal
returns. Jenter, Lewellen, and Warner (2011) perform a similar analysis on a larger sample
of companies selling put options (137 versus 53 companies) by using both initial and sub-
sequent put sales and nd corroborative evidence. Therefore, we rule out the explanation
that intermediaries exploit managers overcondence. In addition, most of the options ex-
pired worthless as shown in Table 1. If the companiesovercondent managers were being
exploited, this would not be the case.
<< Insert Figure 1 here >>
The third explanation postulates that intermediaries buy information not put options;
that is, managers possess private information regarding the companys future prospects and
sell put options only when they have favorable information. The nancial intermediaries
lose money on the put options, but acquire valuable information about the companys future
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stock performance. We postulate that these transactions create a separating equilibrium
in which only managers with positive outlooks sell the put options.
In this paper, we test the extent to which this third explanation accurately describes
the motivation of nancial intermediaries to purchase put options. We use a sample of 53
companies that sold put options on their own stock in the period from 1992 to 2000. We nd
evidence from observing structural breaks in the stock price that the put-option sales caused
an endogenous change in price. Likewise, we study volume data and nd additional support,
this time that intermediaries might be trading slightly before the completion date until right
after the structural break in the stock price. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that the
nancial intermediaries are wisely making use of their gained information by accumulating
shares of the companies issuing the put options. Furthermore, we provide the example of
Premisys for which the intermediary bought $1.75 million worth of put options and possibly
gained more than $80 million by buying Premisys stock around the time of this transaction.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a theoretical model
that explains the informational content of put options. In Section II, we describe the data.
In Section III, we analyze the risk-adjusted abnormal returns, abnormal volume, tests for
structural breaks in both series, and the potential prots for the intermediaries. Section
IV presents policy implications and the conclusion.
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I Theoretical Model
The reason that nancial intermediaries are willing to trade with better informed parties is
that while they lose in the transaction, they gain private information from the companies.
If true, this reasoning requires that depending on their information about their future value,
companies make di¤erent decisions. In other words, the companies must be in a separating
equilibrium. In this section, we demonstrate how this is possible. For simplicity we assume
that the future value can be one of two types: high or low. The high-value company is
willing to sell put options at a specied premium and strike price, while the low-value
company is not willing to sell options under these conditions.
A Example
In this subsection, we provide a basic example of how the separating equilibrium occurs
before proceeding to a more general two-type model with two possible outcomes. For
completeness, we provide a two-type signaling model with a distribution of values in the
Appendix.
A company has one project that has an uncertain value v. This is the entire worth
of the company. The company receives a signal about the distribution of the value of the
project. The signal can be h (high) or ` (low) with equal probability. If the signal is h,
then there is a 4
5
chance that the company is worth $200; 000 (a high value) and a 1
5
chance
it is worth $100; 000 (a low value). If the signal is ` then there is a 1
5
chance the company
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is worth $200; 000 and a 4
5
chance it is worth $100; 000. There are 1; 000 shares of stock.
As is, the stock price is $150. Now assume that the company sells 500 put options for
a combined premium of $10; 000 with a strike price of $150. As a function of value, the
stock price must satisfy:
s =
v + 10; 000  500 maxf150  s; 0g
1000
: (1)
If v  140; 000, then the equilibrium price is s = v
1000
+ 10. On the other hand,
if v  140; 000, then s = v
1000
+ 10   75 + s
2
. This last equation can be simplied to
s = v
500
  130. Thus, with a high value the stock is worth s = 210 and with a low value the
stock is worth s = 70.
A company with a signal of h has an expected stock price before the sale of E[s] =
4
5
200+ 1
5
100 = 180 and after the sale of E[s] = 4
5
210+ 1
5
70 = 182. Therefore, it is worthwhile
to sell the put options. A company with a signal of ` has an expected stock price before the
sale of E[s] = 1
5
200 + 4
5
100 = 120 and after the sale of E[s] = 1
5
210 + 4
5
70 = 98. Therefore,
the options are not worth selling. See Appendix B for a graphical representation of this
analysis.
Hence, we can have a separating equilibrium in which only companies that receive a
high signal sell put options. In such an equilibrium, the company selling the put options,
on average, makes a strict gain from the sale.
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B Two-type Model with Two Outcomes
We now proceed to generalize the basic example into a two-type signaling model with two
possible outcomes. Again, there is a company that has an uncertain value v. The company
gets a signal, h (high) or ` (low), about the distribution of its value. If the signal is h, then
there is a  > 1=2 chance the company is worth vh (a high value), and a (1  ) chance it
is worth v` (a low value) where vh > v`. If the signal is ` then there is a (1  ) chance the
company is worth vh , and a  chance it is worth v`. There are Ns shares of stock.
If a company sells Np put options for the premium price p each with a strike price of x
where p < x, then as a function of value the stock price must satisfy:
s =
v + pNp  Npmaxfx  s; 0g
Ns
: (2)
There is a cuto¤ value v = xNs   pNp below which the option is in the money.
If v  v, then a price of s = v+pNp
Ns
is an equilibrium price. On the other hand, if v  v
then
s =
v
Ns
+
Np
Ns
(p  x+ s) (3)
Solving for s yields
s =
v +Np(p  x)
Ns  Np (4)
Thus, we can make the following assumption:
Assumption A1: v`  xNs pNp  vh (the cuto¤ is between the high and low values).
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This assumption avoids the trivial cases where the options are always out of the money
and the investment bank would never want to buy them or always in the money and the
company would never want to sell them. Thus, in a high state the stock is worth s = vh+pNp
Ns
and in a low state the stock is worth s = v`+Np(p x)
Ns Np .
A company with a signal of h would then have an expected stock price before the sale of
 vh
Ns
+ (1  ) v`
Ns
and after the sale of  vh+pNp
Ns
+ (1  )v`+Np(p x)
Ns Np . A company with a signal
of ` before the sale of the put option might have an expected stock price of (1  ) vh
Ns
+  v`
Ns
and after the sale of the put option of (1   )vh+pNp
Ns
+  v`+Np(p x)
Ns Np . Hence, we can have
signaling via a separating equilibrium if

vh
Ns
+ (1  ) v`
Ns
 vh + pNp
Ns
+ (1  )v` +Np(p  x)
Ns  Np ; (5)
(1  ) vh
Ns
+ 
v`
Ns
 vh + pNp
Ns
+ (1  )v` +Np(p  x)
Ns  Np : (6)
These conditions can be simplied to
0    p+ (1  )v` +Ns(p  x)
Ns  Np ; (7)
0  (1  )p+ v` +Ns(p  x)
Ns  Np : (8)
This discussion leads to the following proposition:
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Proposition 1 Under A1, a separating equilibrium exists if and only if

1   
Ns(p  x)  v`
(Ns  Np) p 
1  

: (9)
For a separating equilibrium to exist, we need Ns > Np (i.e., the number of put options
sold should strictly be smaller than the number of shares outstanding). This is consistent
with the way that the boards of directors authorize put-option sales for ongoing open
market repurchase programs. Also higher premiums p might require a higher strike price
x, in order to maintain the possibility of the separating equilibrium. This is clear because a
company with a low signal would be more inclined to sell put options with a higher premium
p and a higher strike price x may be necessary to deter them from doing so. Further, we
see that a smaller value in the low state v` might require a higher premium p and/or lower
strike price x in order to maintain the possibility of the separating equilibrium. A smaller
value in the low state (when the option is in the money) would make the expected value
of the option higher; hence, the option should command a higher premium (or be adjusted
by a lower strike price).
This model shows that nancially strong companies are rewarded for selling put options
and certifying their quality, while nancially weak companies choose not to participate
because of large expected nancial penalties. This is an unusual way of communicating
information. In most examples of separating equilibria, a strong player must expend e¤ort
or spend cash in order to convey his or her strength. Here, the company communicates its
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strong nancial future and at the same time it receives a cash ow for certifying its quality
rather than enduring a cost from its action. Even with this reward to the strong company
for issuing the put options, the nancially weak company nds this issuance expensive to
mimic.
II Data and Summary Statistics
A Data Sources
We search for all companies that sold put options from January 1988 through December
2000 by using 10-K and 10-Q statements available on the Lexis-Nexis R database for the
whole period and on the SEC EDGAR lings database from January 1994 through De-
cember 2000.8 We nd 383 companies that had at least one of the key phrases in at least
one of their nancial reports. Of these, we drop companies that sold put options only on
interest rate, foreign exchange, and/or debt securities. We are left with 53 companies that
used their own stock as the underlying asset in the issuance of put derivatives. These 53
companies came from 34 industries as indicated by their four-digit SIC codes.
8The period encompasses the years over which companies are actively selling puts on their own stocks
(see Gyoshev (2001), Gyoshev et al. (2012) and Jenter et al. (2011)). Therefore, we terminate our search
period in 2000 because companies suspended their programs with the development of the prolonged bear
market beginning in 2000. Although the Lexis-Nexis R database started collecting the 10-K and 10-Q
statements in 1988, the rst company with a put options sale that we found was IBM in 1992. On the
other hand, the SEC EDGAR lings database stated from January 1994. We searched for the following
phrases: "put derivative", "put option", "equity put", "put feature", "stock put", "put provision", "put
the shares", "sale of put", "sold put", "put sold", "put warrants", or "rights to put."
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B Transaction Dates
Only ten of the 53 companies reported the exact date on which they sold put options for the
rst time. In order to nd the date in the remaining cases, we look through all 10-K and 10-
Q statements for references to the option expiration. Based on these references, we were able
to infer an exact date for an additional eight companies. Similarly, 11 companies reported
the month when they sold put options, and we inferred the month for an additional 16
companies. Four companies reported only the quarter, while the remaining ve companies
reported only the year when they rst issued put options.
The put contracts for which we know the exact date have the expiration date set 3, 6,
9, 12, 18, and 24 months after the sales. Using this knowledge, we are able to infer the
date for other companies through combining information from di¤erent 10-Q and/or 10-K
reports. For instance, the Clorox 10-Q report for the quarter ending on December 31, 1993,
states that Clorox sold put options in the rst scal quarter of 1994(between 7/1/93 and
9/30/93), while the Clorox 10-Q report for the quarter ending on March 31, 1994, states
that all put warrants expired unexercised by February 22, 1994.Therefore, we conclude
that the date on which the contact was signed is six months prior to the expiration on
August 22, 1993, since that is the only possible date that was within the specied dates
and it ts one of the possible customary contract lengths.
This method allows us to infer the exact date for another eight companies. In addition,
by using the 10-K and 10-Q reports for 20 companies, we are able to identify at least
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the quarter that the put-option sale was made. In 16 of those, we are able to accurately
estimate the month by combining information form di¤erent 10-Q and 10-K reports in a
manner similar to that described above.
C Summary Statistics
In Table I, we report several summary statistics for the put options issued by our sample
companies. The majority of the companies, 32 of 53, issued European-style put options;
only 11 issued American-style. Because only American-style options can be traded on the
CBOE, it seems that very few of the companies intended to place their put options publicly.
Supporting this conjecture, the ability of the companies to buy back the options also makes
them nonstandard and hence not tradable on the CBOE. This is directly conrmed by
looking at the second column of Table I in which we report the type of buyers disclosed in
the nancial statements. Only one company discloses that it sold the put options publicly
on an exchange. The rest sold their options to private counter-parties. In most cases
the identity of the buyer is not disclosed, but if disclosed, the buyer is usually either an
investment bank or another institutional investor. More than 40% of the companies that
disclose the maturity of the options issue long-term put options with maturities greater or
equal to one year.
<< Insert Table I here >>
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We report the descriptive statistics of the time until disclosure in the fourth column of
Table I. The median time from the date of the option sale to the date it is disclosed in
the companiesnancial statements is 99 days, while the average is 186 days. Only one
company announced its intent to sell put options in advance of the deal. The maximum
time between deal transaction and announcement is a staggering 1,561 days, or more than
four years.
Further, we report the extent to which the options are exercised or expired. Most of
the options expired out of the money. In only two cases do companies state that all options
were exercised, while in 32 cases all options expired out of the money. In eight cases, the
issuers took advantage of the early settlement option (including Microsoft); and in two
cases, some options were exercised and some expired. Five of the companies did not report
the outcome, which indicates that the put options expired worthless as otherwise they
would have been reported as material.
III Empirical Results
A Abnormal Stock Performance
Table II reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the issuing companies
with an identiable date for their rst put-option sale. Even though as shown in Table I
the put-option sale is reported after more than six months, the average CAR for a two-
14
day window after the date of the sale is slightly more than 2%. (This is statistically
signicant at the 5% level despite the small sample size.) Moreover, the CAR for the
60-day window is 9.08% and is also statistically signicant at the 5% level. Our ndings
of positive and large stock performance after the put-option sale are consistent with both
companies expecting superior future performance and nancial intermediaries trading on
this information immediately after the put-option sales.9
<< Insert Table II here >>
Furthermore, a large negative performance exists in the 60-day period before the put-
option sale. Our understating from speaking with practitioners is that the sale of put
options is a long drawn-out process that takes between one and three months. As we
indicated in the model section, the company managers engage in selling put options only if
they feel the stock is undervalued. From the moment that negotiations of a put-option sale
are initiated until just before the completion date, the random-walk nature of the stock
prices gives us three basic scenarios: the stock could go up, down, or stay at the current
price level. Once the sale is near completion, the managers still consider the sale only in
the latter two scenarios. Hence, because the stock performance of those companies that
have begun negotiations might go up during the negotiations, conditional on the sale, the
stocks performance should be negative. This is a form of survivorship bias. This negative
9The one-year buy-and-hold abnormal return is computed by using the Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999)
method and is 11.67% with a p-value of 0.03045.
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stock performance is also consistent with Stephens and Weisbach (1998) who nd that
share repurchases are negatively related to prior stock-price performance.
B Abnormal Stock Trading Volumes
Abnormal trading volumes perhaps positively inuence the stock price and generate the
positive abnormal returns in the short event windows. Figure 2 is generated by taking
each companys daily volume and dividing it by the daily volume on day -60. This method
normalizes the average volume across this time period to one. We then take the average
of these adjusted volumes over all 18 companies. This method is a crude way to examine
trading volume while treating each company equally independent of its size. The graph
shows volume increasing before the transaction date and staying relatively high until about
ten days after the transaction date before drifting down further. Consequently, we surmise
that most of the increased volume occurs before stock price starts increasing. This increased
volume could be a sign that intermediaries are accumulating shares as the transaction is
becoming more likely and doing so to a large extent without revealing their hand.
<< Insert Figure 2 here >>
The cumulative abnormal relative volume in Table III shows a similar story.10 Although
overall volume signicantly decreases from days -60 to -1, the volume is abnormally high
10See Ajinkya and Jain (1989), Campbell and Wasley (1996) and Cready and Ramanan (1991) for how
abnormal trading volume is computed.
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from (-10,-1). It remains high between 0 and 10 days. The overall abnormal volume does
not remain statistically signicant if we extend it from 10 to 30 days.
<< Insert Table III here >>
C Structural Breaks in Stock Prices
We test if a structural break exists, that is, a sharp unexpected directional change in
the trend of the stock prices. Such a structural break will be an indication that there is
endogenous change produced by the sale of the put options. Therefore, in this subsection,
we follow Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) to test for an endogenous
structural break in stock prices. We compute the bootstrapped p-value following Hansen
(2000).
We start by testing for a structural break in the average abnormal returns of the 18
companies on the exact date of the put-option sales. As reported in Panel A of Table IV,
the Chow (1960) breakpoint test rejects the null hypothesis that no structural break exists
at the exact date at the 1% level (p = 0.0022).
<< Insert Table IV here >>
To better understand the nature of this structural break, we try to nd the most likely
structural break point over the range from days -25 to 25 making use of stock prices from
days -60 to 60 (under the assumption of at most one structural break). Panel B in Table
IV reports our nding that the structural break is seven days after the sale of the put
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options. The p-values for the SupF statistics (Andrews (1993)) as well as for the ExpF and
AveF statistics (Andrews and Ploberger (1994)) are statistically signicant at the 5% level.
Hence, we conclude that the nancial intermediary is not only trading on information, but
doing it skillfully and not making it immediately transparent to the market.
For robustness, we test for a structural break in Panels C and D of Table IV for the
ten companies with reported sales dates only and also nd that the break remains seven
days afterwards (but it is not statistically signicant). When we test for a structural break
in the eight remaining companies with inferred transaction dates, we nd the structural
break is at the day of the sale and is signicant at the 5% level. This gives us condence
in our technique for inferring transaction dates.
Overall, the timing and the statistical signicance of the structural break conrms a
sharp unexpected directional change in the trend of the stock prices. Jenter et al. (2011)
suggest instead that the market upswing is exogenous and that the company managers
are using insider information to correctly time this upswing. The location of our struc-
tural break indicates that their timing seems to indeed be impeccable especially in the
face of potentially long-lasting negotiations. However, another plausible explanation has
the causality reversed. Rather than put sales being placed right before the upswing, the
upswing is coming right after the put sale. The only source of such an upswing in this
causality direction (given that the sales of the put options are still secret) is the nancial
intermediary that bought the put options is actively buying the stock. This nding sup-
ports our explanation that the reason why the nancial intermediary participates is to gain
18
and trade on information.
Furthermore, Jenter at al. (2011) state that discussions with market participants sug-
gest that such o¤ers were extended to all large companies with share repurchase programs
and high stock market liquidity.This statement points toward the timing being chosen by
the nancial intermediary rather than the put-selling company.
D Structural Breaks in Stock Trading Volumes
An analysis of trading volume around the event day most likely demonstrates in retrospect
the extent to which an abnormal activity exists as a result of the private information of
more informed nancial intermediaries. As with stock prices, we test for structural breaks
in trading volumes. Using similar techniques to those used for stock prices in subsection C,
we test for a structural break in the stock volumes at the event day. We make adjustments
for our sample companies by accounting for market volume and report three analyses for
patterns of relative trading volumes.
Panel A of Table V reports a structural break, which is statistically signicant at the
1% level with p = 0.0001 (for all methods we use). Panel B of the same Table shows the
results of tests for structural breaks in the stock volumes for any day between -25 and 25
around the event day. We nd that the most likely structural break is at day -19, which is
statistically signicant at the 1% level with p < 0.0001 (for all methods we use). In Panel
B of Table V, we report a second structural break in the time frame of -19 to 60 at day
19
12, which is statistically signicant at the 5% level with p = 0.0176 (for all methods we
use). As explained above the put-sale negotiation process is a one to three month long
process. The statistical results indicate that the nancial intermediary starts trading on
the information 19 days before the transaction is completed. This skillful trading does not
change the trend of the stock price until seven days after the put-option sale where the stock
prices structural break occurs. Shortly thereafter, the intermediary reduces purchases as
indicated by the structural break in the volume at day 12 after the sale.
<< Insert Table V here >>
Overall these results support the existence of both an abnormal stock price and trading
volume activity surrounding events of put-option sales to intermediaries.
E Potential Realized Prots from Trading on Information.
We have now shown that there was a structural break in stock prices and two structural
breaks in volume (an increase followed by a decrease). We postulate that a nancial
intermediary might be making use of its private information gained from the purchase of
the put option to accumulate shares of the underlying stock. Naturally, if indeed such an
action is taking place, then what are the prots of the perpetrator? Of our 18 companies
(out of the 53) for which we have accurate completion date information, 15 have increases
in volume (around the transaction date) and three have decreases in volume. Of these 15
companies with increases in volume, 11 have price increases while four have price decreases.
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As an example, one of the companies that has both an increase in volume and an
increase in price is Premisys Communications Inc. Premisys disclosed its put transaction
of September 15, 1999 on September 24, 1998 in their 10-K for the scal year ending on
June 26, 1998. It was the only company that we are aware of that disclosed the precise
number of put contracts. This disclosure allows us to compute the following example.
Premisys sold 10,000 contracts of put options for $1.75 million at a strike price of $10.625
per share for 100 shares of their common stock "PRMS." If one entity accounted for the
abnormal volume, then that entity would have made around $80 million.11 If this entity
was the nancial intermediary that bought the options from Premisys, then it would have
paid only $1.75 million for the information leading to this gain.
For all 11 companies with volume and price increases, the total potential prot is $717
million. For the three companies with volume increases and price decreases, the total
potential loss is $70 million. Thus, a hypothetical intermediary could have made $647
million on these initial put purchases (net of put costs this should be close to 98% of the
sum). While these are all on the initial put transactions, Gyoshev et al. (2012) show that
in the case of Microsoft, the total expense paid on the put options on Microsoft increased
more than 15 times form $49 million for the rst sale to the $766 for the last sale for a total
11We compute the abnormal trading activity by multiplying the abnormal volume by the number of days
of abnormal volume by the potential prot. We estimate the potential prot as the di¤erence between
the average stock price around the sale and the average stock price from 50 to 60 days after the sale. For
Premisys, the average volume before the structural break was 595,934 per day the average volume around
the put option sale between the two structural breaks in the volume series was 1,098,285, which gives as an
abnormal volume of 502,351 for 31 days between the two structural breaks. The average price between the
structural breaks was $9.27 and the average price between days 50 and 60 days after the sale was $14.34.
So the di¤erence is $5.07, which gives as abnormal prot of around $80 million.
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of around $2 billion, indicating very high potential prots. Microsoft stock is more liquid
than the Premisys stock implying the intermediaries should have been able to realize higher
returns (which was 40 times the put premiums for Premisys). Thus, it is not unreasonably
to estimate the intermediary prots in the hundreds of billions of dollars over the 137
companies that sold put options reported by Jenter et al. (2011).
IV Policy implications and concluding remarks.
Jenter et al. (2011) o¤er an explanation for why put sales are right before stock-price in-
creases. Namely, that the managers are excellent at timing their put sales. We o¤er another
plausible explanation: the put sales provide signaling and the nancial intermediaries are
making use of this information to purchase stocks thus increasing the stock price. In other
words, the causation is in a di¤erent direction. We support the idea that put-option sales
trigger stock price increases and trading volume increases, instead of stock prices causing
the initiation of the put sales. We develop a theoretical model that explains how this
triggering e¤ect can occur and nd empirical evidence in support of its explanation. Our
results are robust even after adjusting stock prices for market risk and trading volume for
market volume.
A nancial intermediary that uses option purchases appears to bypass the illegal aspect
from gaining insider information. Theoretically, a trader wants to gain insider information
because this information allows the trader to predict stock-price movements and realize
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abnormal prots. In put-option purchases, intermediaries do not directly gain any insider
performance information, but they do indirectly gain the view of the companys manage-
ment on the future stock-price performance. Only the managers with positive outlooks are
willing to sell put options to the intermediaries. Furthermore, these nancial intermediaries
have such information exclusively in their possession on average for more than six months,
as per the current disclosure regulations.
Hence, from the policy perspective our results shed light on that absence of disclosure
currently allowed in the US markets. The lack of regulations has allowed not only compa-
nies, but also nancial intermediaries to prot from trading in company-issued derivatives
at the expense of broad market participants. In the spirit of recent trends to improve
company disclosure, one clear solution to the incentive problem for nancial intermediaries
is to mandate full and immediate disclosure of all put-option sales pursued by companies.
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Appendix A. Two-type model with continuous distrib-
ution of outcomes
The value of the company is distributed according to the distribution Fi where the infor-
mation i is either ` or h. The number of shares is Ns. The number of put options is Np.
We must have Np < Ns. The strike price is x. The premiums that the company receives
for the sale of the options is p Np. For each realized value, the share price satises
s =
v + pNp  Npmaxfx  s; 0g
Ns
: (A1)
The cuto¤ value v is such that companies with values below v have put options in the
money. The cuto¤ value satises:
x =
v + pNp
Ns
: (A2)
This implies v = xNs  pNp. The value v must be positive since Ns > Np and p  x (one
cannot sell put options for more than their maximum possible value).
Therefore, the share price with options sp(v) as a function of value is
sp(v) =
8>><>>:
v (x p)Np
Ns Np if v < v
,
v+pNp
Ns
otherwise.
(A3)
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Proposition 2 A separating equilibrium exists if and only if E[sp(v)ji = h]  E[ vNs ji = h]
and E[sp(v)ji = `]  E[ vNs ji = `]:
This is equivalent to the following two conditions:
Z xNs pNp
0
v +Np(p  x)
Ns  Np dFh +
Z 1
xNs pNp
v + pNp
Ns
dFh 
Z 1
0
v
Ns
dFh (A4)Z xNs pNp
0
v +Np(p  x)
Ns  No dF` +
Z 1
xNs pNp
v + pNp
Ns
dF` 
Z 1
0
v
Ns
dF` (A5)
or
Z xNs pNp
0
Npv +NsNp(p  x)
(Ns  No)Ns dFh +
Z 1
xNs pNp
pNp
Ns
dFh  0 (A6)Z xNs pNp
0
Npv +NsNp(p  x)
(Ns  No)Ns dF` +
Z 1
xNs pNp
pNp
Ns
dF`  0 (A7)
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Appendix B. Figure Visualizing the Model 
  
Figure Visualizing the Model: Stakeholder value at put expiration. Stakeholder Value at Put 
Expiration is the value accorded to each stakeholder at put expiration; Project Value at Put 
Expiration is the value that the only project of the company will have at the time of put 
expiration; T -- Company Value is the value accorded to a stockholder if the company does not 
sell put options; S -- Stockholder Profile is the outcome profile for a stockholder of a company 
that has sold put options on its own stock. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative average abnormal returns for put-option issuers from trading 
days –60 to +60 relative to the first put-option sale. We compute the cumulative average 
abnormal returns using the market model. The market model parameters are estimated using 
a window from 180 to 61 days before the event date, which is the day of the put-option sale. 
We use the CRSP value-weighted portfolio as our proxy for the market. We include only the 
ten companies that disclose the exact date when they sold put options for the first time and 
the eight companies for which the date can be inferred as explained in the data section. 
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Figure 2. Trading volumes for put-option issuers from –60 to +60 days relative to the put-
option sale date. The event date, day 0, is the day of the put-option sale. All volumes are 
normalized by taking each company’s daily volume and dividing it by the daily volume at day -
60. The “Average Daily Volume” is the adjusted volumes over all 18 companies (ten companies 
with the exact put sales date and eight companies for which the date can be inferred). The 
“Average between the Structural Breaks” is the average weighted volume over the periods 
separated by the structural breaks in the volume series at days -19 and 12.  
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Table I 
Summary Statistics of the Put-Option Contracts 
The IB with ID denotes the cases in which the exact identity of an investment bank is reported as a buyer. The IB no ID denotes the 
cases where the companies only state that the buyer is an investment bank. Only ten of the 53 companies report the exact date on 
which they have sold put options for the first time. Based on references to option expiration in other 10-Q and/or 10-K forms, we are 
able to infer an exact date for an additional eight companies. Eleven companies report only the month when they sold put options, and 
we infer the month for an additional 16 companies. In order to compute the number of days till disclosure, we assume in these cases 
that the date is in the middle of the month. Four companies report only the quarter. For these companies we assume that the date is the 
middle of the quarter. The remaining five companies report only the year when they first issued put options, and we report these as 
N/A. 
 
 
For the whole program      For the first put option sale   
 
Option Type Buyer Type Option Outcome   Option Maturity Days till Disclosure 
# of companies # of companies # of companies   # of companies # of days 
European 32   IB with ID 5   Expired 
Worthless 
32   Below six months 13   Average 186 
American 11  IB no ID 1  Last Tranche 
Settled   
6  Between six month 
and one year 
13  Median 99 
Both A & E 1  Financial 
Intermediary 
1  Last Tranche 
Exercised  
8  Exactly one year 9  Minimum -5 
Exotic 1  Independent third 
party 
14  All Exercised  2  Greater than one 
year 
11  Maximum 1,561 
N/A 8  Private placement 16  N/A  5  N/A 7  N/A 5 
   N/A 14          
   Open market 1          
      Investment Trust 1                   
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Table II 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Put-Option Sale 
The CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal returns. We compute the CARs by using a market 
model. The market model parameters are estimated using a window from 180 to 61 days before 
the event date, which is the day of the put-option sale. We use the CRSP value-weighted 
portfolio as our proxy for the market. We include only 18 companies (ten companies with the 
exact put sales date and eight companies for which the date can be inferred). We report the CARs 
for ten different event windows: from 60 days to one day before the put-option sale, i.e., (-60, -
1); from 30 days to one day before the put-option sale (-30, -1); from 10 days to one day before 
the put-option sale (-10, -1); from the day of the sale to one day after (0, 1); from the day of the 
sale to two days after (0, 2); from the day of the sale to three days after (0, 3); from the day of the 
sale to ten days after (0, 10); from the day of the sale to 20 days after (0, 20); from the day of the 
sale to 30 days after (0, 30); and from day 0 to 60 days after (0, 60). The p-value for the t-test 
that the average CAR equals zero and a Wilcoxon Rank test for the median are in parenthesis. 
The % Positive (Negative) is the percentage of companies with positive (negative) CARs during 
the corresponding event window. 
 
Event Window 
 
Average CAR % 
Median CAR 
% 
% Negative % Positive 
(-60,-1)  -9.21*** -7.65**  66.7 33.3 
 
 (0.0034) (0.0494) 
  (-30,-1)  -5.00**  -3.18  55.6 44.4 
 
 (0.0131) (0.1846) 
  (-10,-1)  -0.41  -0.94  50.0 50.0 
 
 (0.1410) (0.3994) 
  (0,1)   0.29   1.14  27.8 72.2 
 
 (0.1488) (0.2212) 
  (0,2)   2.01**   2.12  33.3 66.7 
 
 (0.0198) (0.0269) 
  (0,3)   1.49*   1.66  33.3 66.7 
 
 (0.0646) (0.1061) 
  (0,10)  -1.39   3.48  33.3 66.7 
 
 (0.4301) (0.1144) 
  (0,20)   1.98   4.88**  38.9 61.1 
 
 (0.1155) (0.0770) 
  (0,30)   4.3   4.58*  33.3 66.7 
 
 (0.1131) (0.0649) 
  (0,60)   9.08**   3.40*  33.3 66.7 
 
 (0.0441) (0.0649) 
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Table III 
Cumulative Abnormal Relative Volume around the Put-Option Sale 
The CARV denotes the cumulative abnormal relative volume for only the 18 companies (ten 
companies with the exact put sales date and eight companies for which the date can be inferred). 
We compute the abnormal trading volume by following Ajinkya and Jain (1989), Campbell and 
Wasley (1996) and Cready and Ramanan (1991). We report the CARVs for the same ten event 
windows as in Table II plus 3 additional windows corresponding to the windows defined by the 
structural breaks in Table 5. The p-value for the t-test that the average CARV equals zero and a 
Wilcoxon Rank test for the median are in parenthesis. The % Positive (Negative) is the 
percentage of companies with positive (negative) CARs during the corresponding event window. 
 
Event Window  Average CARV % Median CARV % % Negative % Positive 
(-60,-1)  -828.19*** -783.78 61.1 38.9 
 
  (0.0001)  (0.1061) 
  (-30,-1)   -83.7  45.08 50.0 50.0 
 
  (0.388)  (0.4831) 
  (-10,-1)   136.88***  126.22 38.9 61.1 
 
  (0.0001)  (0.1323) 
  (0,1)   46.43***  27.12* 33.3 66.7 
 
  (0.0034)  (0.0708) 
  (0,2)   64.54***  55.22 38.9 61.1 
 
  (0.0021)  (0.1231) 
  (0,3)   81.6***  68.33 44.4 55.6 
 
  (0.0018)  (0.1419) 
  (0,10)   130.32**  52.4 44.4 55.6 
 
  (0.0165)  (0.2212) 
  (0,20)   120.35  -45.44 55.6 44.4 
 
  (0.1012)  (0.4661) 
  (0,30)   127.85*  -68.94 66.7 33.3 
 
  (0.0958)  (0.383) 
  (0,60)   -94.1 -242.95 55.6 44.4 
    (0.1862)  (0.3669)     
(-60,-19)  -929.07*** -990.76*** 72.2 27.8 
 
  (0.0001)  (0.0069) 
  (-19,12)   218.20***  148.97 55.6 44.4 
 
  (0.0056)  (0.2899) 
  (12,60)   -240.56**  -533.48 80.0 20.0 
 
  (0.0165)  (0.2475) 
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Table IV 
Tests for a Structural Break in the Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
around the Put-Option Sale 
The CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal returns. We compute the CARs by using a market 
model. The market model parameters are estimated using a window from 180 to 61 days before 
the event date, which is the day of the put-option sale. We use the CRSP value-weighted 
portfolio as our proxy for the market. We include only 18 companies (ten companies with the 
exact put sales date and eight companies for which the date can be inferred). We follow Andrews 
(1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) to test for an endogenous structural break in stock 
prices. We compute the bootstrapped p-value following Hansen (2000). Panel A tests for a 
structural break in the average abnormal returns of the 18 companies on the exact date of the put-
option sales. Panel B finds the most likely structural break point over the range from days -25 to 
25 making use of stock prices from days -60 to 60 (under the assumption of at most one 
structural break). For robustness, in Panel C, we test for the structural break with only the ten 
companies with reported sales dates. Panel D tests for the structural break of the eight remaining 
companies with inferred transaction dates. 
 
Panel A: Tests for a structural break at the event date in the cumulative abnormal returns around 
the put-option sale of the 18 companies 
Null Hypothesis:  No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Chow Breakpoint Test:  0 
Equation Sample:  1,121 
Varying regressors:  All equation variables 
F-statistic 9.764534 Prob. F(1,119) 0.0022 
Log likelihood ratio 9.542293 Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0020 
Wald Statistic  9.764534 Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0018 
Panel B: Tests for a structural break at any date during the event period in the CARs around the 
put-option sale of the 18 companies 
Estimated Breakpoint (index):  7 
(Day 0 is the Event date) 
 Percentage of Sample: 0.561983 
Bootstrap Replications: 5000 
 
Test Andrews Bootstrap Hetero-Corrected 
 
Statistic P-value P-value P-value 
SupF 7.352160 0.050764 0.046600 0.040800 
ExpF 2.252957 0.038070 0.036600 0.030200 
AveF 3.881367 0.030671 0.029400 0.018200 
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Panel C: Tests for a structural break at any date during the event period in the CARs around the 
put-option sale of the ten companies with disclosed sale dates  
Estimated Breakpoint (index):   7 
 (Day 0 is the Event date) 
  Percentage of Sample:   0.561983 
 Bootstrap Replications: 5000 
 
 
Test Andrews Bootstrap Hetero-Corrected 
  Statistic P-value P-value P-value 
SupF 3.747035 0.268700 0.251800 0.253800 
ExpF 0.940642 0.194738 0.210000 0.196000 
AveF  1.687371 0.170027 0.180800 0.155400 
Panel D: Tests for a structural break at any date during the event period in the CARs around the 
put-option sale of the eight companies with inferred sale dates  
Estimated Breakpoint (index):  0 
(Day 0 is the Event date) 
  Percentage of Sample:   0.504132 
Bootstrap Replications: 5000 
 
Test Andrews Bootstrap Hetero-Corrected 
  Statistic P-value P-value P-value 
SupF 6.133544 0.089607 0.0838 0.0654 
ExpF 1.913732 0.056954 0.0590 0.0514 
AveF 3.188776 0.051351 0.0532 0.0442 
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Table V 
Tests for a Structural Break in the Cumulative Abnormal Relative Volumes  
around the Put-Option Sale 
The CARV denotes the cumulative abnormal relative volume. We compute the abnormal trading 
volume following Ajinkya and Jain (1989), Campbell and Wasley (1996), and Cready and 
Ramanan (1991) for the 18 companies (ten companies with the exact put sales date and eight 
companies for which the date can be inferred). We follow Andrews (1993) and Andrews and 
Ploberger (1994) to test for an endogenous structural break in stock prices. We compute the 
bootstrapped p-value following Hansen (2000). Panel A tests for a structural break in the stock 
volumes at the event day. Panel B tests for a structural break in the stock volumes for any day 
between -25 and 25 around the event day. In Panel B, we find a structural break at day -19, 
which divided the whole sample into two subsamples: form days -60 to -20 and from days -19 to 
60. In Panel C, we apply the structure break test on the second subsample of -19 to 60.  We find 
a second structural break of the CARV around the put-option sale after the First Structural Break 
point on day 12. 
 
Panel A: Tests for a structural break at the event date of the CARV around the put-option sale of 
the 18 companies 
Null Hypothesis:  No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Chow Breakpoint Test:   0 
Equation Sample:  1,121 
Varying regressors:  All equation variables 
F-statistic 16.29990 Prob. F(1,119) 0.0001 
Log likelihood ratio 15.53280 Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0001 
Wald Statistic  16.29990 Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0001 
Panel B: Tests for a structural break at any date of the CARV around the put-option sale of the 
18 companies 
Estimated Breakpoint (index):   -19 
(Day 0 is the Event date) 
 Percentage of Sample:  0.347107 
Bootstrap Replications: 5000 
 
Test Andrews Bootstrap Hetero-Corrected 
 
Statistic P-value P-value P-value 
SupF 66.440340 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
ExpF 29.758617 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
AveF 23.648257 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
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Panel C: Tests for a second structural break of the CARV around the put-option sale of the 18 
companies at any date after the first structural break 
Estimated Breakpoint (index):   12 
(Day 0 is the Event date) 
 Percentage of Sample:  0.400000 
Bootstrap Replications: 5000 
 
Test Andrews Bootstrap Hetero-Corrected 
 
Statistic P-Value P-Value P-Value 
SupF 15.539198 0.002301 0.002200 0.017600  
ExpF  5.344512 0.000088 0.001200 0.009600  
AveF  8.167059 0.000020 0.000400 0.000600  
 
 
 
